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When people estimate event frequency, they sometimes retrieve and count event instances. 
This  study  demonstrates  a  direct  relation  between  the  use  of these  enumeration-based 
strategies and the contents of memory. In 3 experiments, participants studied target-context 
word pairs, estimated presentation frequency for target words, and recalled  context words. 
Study  time,  target-context  relatedness,  and  study-phase  instructions  were  manipulated, 
producing large differences in memory for context words. When context memory was best, 
estimation  time increased  sharply  with  presentation  frequency,  and  the  steepness  of this 
estimation  time-presentation  frequency  function  decreased  with  context  memory.  These 
results indicate that enumeration  was common only when context memory was good, that 
encoding factors determine how frequency is represented, and that the contents of memory 
restrict strategy selection. 
People  use  a  variety  of  strategies  to  estimate  event 
frequency. Under some conditions, enumeration is common; 
enumeration-based estimates are produced when a  person 
retrieves and counts relevant event instances and uses the 
derived count as the basis for a frequency judgment (Barsa- 
lou & Ross, 1986; Begg, Maxwell, Mitterer, & Harris, 1986; 
Blair  &  Burton,  1987;  Brown,  1995;  Bruce,  Hockley, & 
Craik, 1991; Burton & Blair, 1991; Conrad & Brown, 1994; 
Conrad,  Brown,  &  Cashman,  in  press;  Greene,  1989; 
Williams & Durso,  1986). When people do not enumerate, 
they rely on memory assessment and direct retrieval strate- 
gies. A  memory assessment strategy has two components: 
First, some aspect of memory is evaluated (e.g., similarity 
between a probe and the contents of memory, see Hintzman, 
1988;  Jones  &  Heit,  1993;  and  Nosofsky,  1988;  ease  of 
retrieval, see Tversky &  Kahneman,  1973;  trace strength, 
see Hintzman, 1969,  1970; and Morton,  1968) and used as 
an index of relative event frequency; second, this index is 
converted  to  a  numerical  value  by  mapping  it  onto  a 
subjective response range (Brown,  1995;  Conrad et al., in 
press;  Hintzman,  1988).  When  people  use  enumeration- 
based and memory assessment strategies, information about 
frequency  is  inferred  from  some  aspect  of memory that 
represents frequency in an indirect manner (e.g., number of 
retrievable traces, similarity, etc.). People can also represent 
frequency information directly by storing and updating facts 
that code frequency of occurrence in a numerical or nonnu- 
merical  format (e.g.,  "The word BOOK appeared on the 
prior list six times," or "The word BOOK appeared on the 
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prior list quite  a  few times"; Alba, Chromiak,  Hasher, & 
Attig, 1980; Brooks, 1985; Blair & Burton, 1987; Conrad et 
al., in press; Jonides & Jones,  1992; Menon,  1993; Menon, 
Raghubir, & Schwarz,  1995; Underwood,  1969; Watldns & 
LeCompte,  1991).  When  such  facts  are  retrieved  and 
evaluated,  people  are  said  to  be  using  a  direct  retrieval 
strategy. 
Strategy  selection  is  not  arbitrary,  nor  is  it  without 
consequence.  It  is  obvious  that  the  contents  of memory 
restrict  strategy  selection.  For  example,  direct  retrieval 
strategies are ruled  out when facts about event frequency 
have  not  been  stored  in  memory. Likewise,  enumeration 
seems  unlikely  when  memories  for  individual  event  in- 
stances are inaccessible. It is also becoming clear that event 
properties and encoding factors determine the nature of the 
frequency-relevant contents of memory. In particular, there 
is now evidence that direct coding of event frequencies is 
more common when event instances occur at regular inter- 
vals than when they do not (Conrad et al., in press; Menon, 
1993), and that retrievable traces are more common when 
event instances are distinctive than when they are similar to 
one another (Brown,  1995; Conrad et al., in press; Menon, 
1993).  Finally,  strategy selection  can  affect the  effort re- 
quired to generate a frequency estimate and the magnitude 
and accuracy of the estimate produced.  This can be seen 
when enumeration-based responses are compared with non- 
enumerated responses; other things being equal, the former 
take longer to produce and may be smaller in magnitude and 
more accurate than the latter (Brown, 1995). 
In brief, it is  likely that event properties and encoding 
factors  determine  how  frequency  is  represented,  that  the 
nature  of the  frequency representation influences  strategy 
selection, and that strategy selection is related to the speed 
and  accuracy of a  response.  Taken together,  these  claims 
constitute  a  multiple-strategy  perspective  on  event  fre- 
quency.  The  three  experiments  reported  below  were  de- 
signed to provide evidence for this perspective by document- 
ing  a  direct  connection  between  encoding  variables,  the 
frequency-relevant contents of memory, strategy selection, 
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and estimation performance. Specifically, this research dem- 
onstrates that stimulus and instructional factors that make 
event instances more memorable also increase the use of 
enumeration-based strategies, and that use of these strategies 
affects  both  response  times and  the  magnitude  of  the 
estimates produced. 
The relation between event memory and enumeration has 
previously been investigated, though indirectly (Barsalou & 
Ross, 1986; Bruce et al., 1991; Greene, 1989; Lewandowsky 
&  Smith,  1983; Tversky &  Kahneman, 1973; Williams & 
Durso,  1986).  Typically, researchers have approached this 
issue by exposing people to a word list comprising exem- 
plars drawn from distinct taxonomic categories. After the 
study phase, these people judge how many members of the 
test categories were included in the study list and are then 
asked to recall as many of the previously presented items as 
they can. This procedure is often extended by manipulating 
factors  known  to  affect  cued  recall  (e.g.,  study  time, 
typicality,  generation,  blocking,  spacing).  If  people  do 
enumerate, and if the magnitude of a frequency estimate is 
proportional to the number of items retrieved, then condi- 
tions that produce the best memory for the contents of the 
study list should also produce the largest frequency esti- 
mates. As predicted, the largest and, in some cases, the most 
accurate estimates are often observed when event memory is 
the best. This relation between memory and estimation has 
been taken as evidence for the use of enumeration-based 
strategies. 
There are two problems with this conclusion. First, as 
Watkins and LeCompte (1991)  pointed out, the fact that 
event memory and judged frequency are affected in the same 
way by the same variables does not mean that people recall 
event instances when estimating event frequency. There are 
alternative ways to interpret this finding. For example, one 
could adopt the view that people never enumerate, but that 
factors that promote accurate memory also create robust, 
stable  memory  traces.  Other  things  being  equal,  these 
memorable  traces  should be  more  accessible,  feel  more 
familiar, and/or resemble probe items more closely than the 
weak or degraded traces encoded under less advantageous 
conditions and, hence, should yield larger estimates. The 
second problem concerns the assumption that larger esti- 
mates necessarily reflect greater success in retrieving rel- 
evant event instances. Recent findings have indicated that 
enumeration-based estimates are smaller, sometimes much 
smaller, than nonenumerated estimates (Brown, 1995; Bur- 
ton &  Blair,  1991;  Conrad &  Brown,  1994).  Thus, in the 
absence  of an  independent  indication  that  instances  are 
retrieved,  a  relation  between  memory  performance  and 
estimate size is ambiguous; it may indicate that people in 
one group were more successful at retrieving relevant event 
instances or that they tended to rely on nonenumeration 
strategies. 
As were the studies cited above, the present research was 
concerned with the issue of event memory and enumeration 
and used  a  research  strategy that involved manipulating 
memory  variables  and  observing  their  effect on judged 
frequency and cued recall. However, this study differed from 
earlier ones  in two important respects.  First, participants 
were  timed  as  they  generated  their  estimates  because 
enumeration is characterized by a unique, readily identifi- 
able response time profile (Brown, 1995;  Conrad et al., in 
press). This makes it possible to determine whether a given 
condition promotes enumeration, without having to accept 
questionable assumptions concerning the relation between 
cued recall, estimate size, and strategy selection. Second, the 
prediction here was not that "any variable that facilitates 
cued  recall  should  lead  to  higher  categorical  frequency 
estimates" (Green,  1989,  p. 235), or that "any factor that 
affects the memorability of instances of an event will have 
an effect on frequency estimations of that event" (Williams 
& Durso, 1986, p. 388). Rather, this research evaluated how 
memory affects strategy use. In particular, it investigated the 
hypothesis that people are more likely to use enumeration- 
based strategies when event memory is good than when it is 
poor and are more likely to rely on nonenumeration strate- 
gies when event memory is poor than when it is good. This 
hypothesis gave rise to two specific predictions: first, that the 
function relating response times to presentation frequency 
should be steeper when event memory is good than when it 
is poor; second, that participants should tend to underesti- 
mate event frequency, except when event memory is so poor 
that enumeration is rarely attempted. 
Previous research (Brown,  1995)  provided the basis for 
both predictions. In this study, verbal protocols (Experiment 
1) and response times (Experiments 2 and 3) were collected 
as participants judged the frequency of target words pre- 
sented  in  either  variable  or  consistent  contexts.  In  both 
conditions, participants studied word pairs consisting of a 
target word (always a category label; e.g., MAMMAL) and 
the context words (always a category exemplar; e.g., dog). 
The context word changed from one presentation of the 
target word to the next in the  variable-context condition 
(e.g.,  MAMMAL-dog,  MAMMAL-tiger,  MAMMAL- 
horse  .... )  but  not  in  the  consistent-context  condition. 
Instead, each target word was paired with the same context 
word on each presentation (e.g., MAMM~g,  MAMMAL- 
dog, MAMMAL-dog  .... ). 
The  protocol  data  indicated  that  participants  in  the 
variable-context group often enumerated (i.e., retrieved and 
counted context words) and that participants in the consistent- 
context group did not. Studies by Conrad and Brown (1994) 
and by Marx  (1985)  provided evidence that the relation 
between context variability and enumeration demonstrated 
by these verbal reports is a general one. Conrad and Brown 
(1994)  replicated these protocol results by using a study list 
that differed in both content and presentation frequency from 
the  one  used by  Brown  (1995).  In  particular,  the  target 
words, which never appeared more than 12 times, always 
referred to different classes of consumer products, and the 
context words always referred to brand 'names (e.g., NEWS- 
PAPER-New York Times, AUTOMOBILE-Chevrolet,  etc.). 
Marx (1985) collected retrospective written protocols rather 
than concurrent verbal reports and manipulated the nature of 
the encoding task rather than the nature of the context word. 
Participants in one group were required to generate a unique 
sentence each time a repeated target word appeared, whereas 
participants  in  a  second  group  were  required  to  judge 900  BROWN 
whether the repeated target words were common or uncom- 
mon. Consistent with the results reported in Brown (1995) 
and  Conrad  and  Brown  (1994),  77%  of the  generation 
participants  claimed  that  they enumerated,  whereas  only 
11% of the judgment participants made the same claim. In 
other  words,  enumeration  was  common  only  when  the 
semantic context differed from one presentation of a target 
word to the next. Given the range of stimuli, encoding tasks, 
and response modes involved in these studies, it is highly 
unlikely that the relation between context variability and 
enumeration they illustrate is an artifact of some particular 
experimental  detail  (e.g.,  the  target  words  assigned  to 
different levels  of presentation  frequency or the  specific 
context words  selected  to  accompany the  target  words). 
Rather,  these  studies  support the  conclusion that context 
variability, regardless  of how it is  achieved, is  at least a 
necessary  condition  for  enumeration  (also  see  Blair  & 
Burton, 1987; Conrad et al., in press; Menon, 1993). 
Response times reported in Brown (1995; Experiments 2 
and 3) provided converging evidence for this conclusion. 
Specifically, response times increased steeply with presenta- 
tion frequency in the variable-context condition but not in 
the consistent-context condition. In other words, participants 
in  the  variable-context group  responded  more rapidly to 
target words that had been presented only a few times than to 
those that had been presented many times, whereas partici- 
pants in the consistent-context group responded rapidly to 
all  target  words  regardless  of how  often  they  had  been 
studied. This Context ×  Presentation Frequency interaction 
for response times was observed in two experiments and was 
interpreted as follows. First, it was assumed that participants 
in the response time experiments used the same strategies as 
their counterparts in the protocol experiment and, hence, that 
variable-context participants often enumerated. Second, it 
was assumed that enumeration involves the serial retrieval 
of event instances and that the number of instances retrieved 
prior to a response was related to the number of instances 
studied. Given that the retrieval process can access only one 
event instance  at  a  time  (Bousfield &  Sedgewick,  1944; 
Gruenewald & Lockhead, 1980; Indow & Togano, 1970), it 
follows that response times should increase with presenta- 
tion frequency when participants rely on enumeration-based 
strategies. 
The relatively fiat response time functions observed in the 
consistent-context condition were explained by assuming 
that participants who received the consistent-context study 
list relied on nonenumeration strategies. In general, people 
who do not enumerate either retrieve a value from memory 
(i.e., use a direct retrieval strategy) or determine the target 
item's relative frequency and then convert this qualitative 
value to a  numerical one (i.e., use a  memory assessment 
strategy).  Because  these  strategies  do  not  involve  the 
iterative retrieval of event instances, they can be executed 
rapidly, and the time required to arrive at an estimate should 
be unrelated to presentation frequency. Thus, when people 
rely on nonenumeration strategies, response times should be 
fast and little affected by presentation frequency. 
This earlier research provided good evidence that people 
use both enumeration-based and nonenumeration strategies 
and demonstrated that conditions that foster enumeration 
yield steep response time functions and that conditions that 
hamper it yield very shallow ones. In the present study, the 
steepness of the response time function was expected to be 
directly related to memory for event instances, with condi- 
tions  leading  to  the  best  event  memory  producing  the 
steepest function, and those leading to the worst producing 
the shallowest. This prediction assumed that strategy selec- 
tion is influenced by memory for relevant event instances 
and that enumeration-based strategies would be selected less 
often as instances become more difficult to retrieve. In other 
words, the percentage of slow enumeration-based responses 
should be the highest when event memory is best and should 
drop off as it worsens. This would produce the predicted 
relation between response time and context memory. 
Event memory was predicted to be related to the magni- 
tude of the frequency estimates, as well as to the time taken 
to produce them,  with participants  underestimating event 
frequency when event memory is moderate to good, but not 
when it is poor. Like the response time prediction, results 
reported in Brown (1995) provided a basis for this somewhat 
counterintuitive prediction (cf. Greene,  1989; Williams  & 
Durso, 1986). In this earlier study, variable-context partici- 
pants, who often enumerated, tended to underestimate event 
frequencies, and consistent-context participants, who relied 
on nonenumeration strategies, tended to overestimate them 
(at least when an upper bound for the response range was not 
provided). 
Underestimation observed in the variable-context condi- 
tion was considered to be a direct consequence of enumera- 
tion. When people enumerate, they often forget or fail to 
retrieve all relevant instances, and they are prone to extrapo- 
late conservatively  when they attempt to adjust enumeration- 
based  counts  to  compensate  for  retrieval  failure.  These 
tendencies  work  together,  yielding  estimated  frequencies 
that are typically smaller than actual frequencies. Moreover, 
even  when  people do  not  always  enumerate,  the  use of 
enumeration on some trials may lead to underestimation. As 
mentioned above, most nonenumeration strategies involve 
the mapping of a qualitative or relative value onto a response 
range.  When  no  range  information  is  provided,  people 
appear  to  use  numbers  generated  by  enumeration-based 
responses to induce its properties (Brown &  Siegler, 1993, 
1996).  Because  enumeration-based  estimates  tend  to  be 
conservative, the upper bound of the inferred response range 
is likely to be as small or smaller than the upper bound of the 
stimulus range.  In turn, estimated frequency should be as 
small if not smaller than actual frequency when people map 
a  relative value (produced by a  nonenumeration process) 
onto a  restricted response range. As  a result, people who 
enumerate on some trials, even a few, should also tend to 
underestimate event frequencies when they use nonenumera- 
tion strategies. Thus, if context memory and enumeration are 
related, and enumeration-based responses are used to induce 
the properties of the response range, then conditions that 
promote moderate to good recall of event instances should 
produce a pronounced and equivalent underestimation bias. 
This bias should be mitigated only when context memory is 
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Overview of the Experiments 
The experiments described below were designed to deter- 
mine whether factors that increase the memorability of event 
instances would also increase the use of enumeration• In all 
three,  participants  studied  lists  of word pairs.  Each  pair 
consisted of a target word and a context word. The target 
words were repeated a variable number of times across the 
list, whereas each context word appeared only once. As a 
result, each word pair represented a unique stimulus combi- 
nation. The study phase was followed by a frequency test, 
which  was  followed  by  a  cued-recall  test.  During  the 
frequency test,  participants  were timed as  they estimated 
how many times each target word had been presented, and 
during  the  (untimed)  cued-recall test,  they  attempted  to 
recall all of the context words that had been paired with each 
of the target words. 
To  assess  the  relation  between  context  memory  and 
enumeration,  target-context  relatedness  and  study  times 
were varied across experiments and study-phase instructions 
were manipulated within experiment, but between subjects. 
Specifically, in Experiment 1,  participants  studied related 
context word pairs for 6.0 s each; in Experiment 2, partici- 
pants had only 2.0 s to study each related-context word pair; 
and in Experiment 3,  participants  studied unrelated word 
pairs for 6.0 s each. ~ In the related-context list, each target 
word was  a  category label, and each context word was  a 
category exemplar. (This list was identical to the one studied 
by people in the variable-context groups in a previous study; 
Brown, 1995.) The unrelated list contained the same target 
words as the related list, but the context words were selected 
so that there was no obvious association between a given 
context word and the target word with which it was paired 
(e.g.,  MAMMAL-lid, MAMMAL-paper, MAMMAL-ring, 
•  •  .). 
Data were collected from three groups of participants in 
each  experiment:  a  context memory  group,  a  frequency 
group,  and  a  general  memory  group.  Prior  to  the  study 
phase,  participants  in  the  context  memory  group  were 
informed that  a  cued-recall  test  would  follow the  study 
phase and were advised to commit each target--context pair 
to memory. Frequency group participants were told about 
the  frequency test  and  were  encouraged  to  pay  careful 
attention  to  how  often  each  target  word  was  presented. 
General memory participants were instructed to study the 
word pairs in preparation for a memory test, but the nature of 
the test was left unspecified. 
Study  time  and  context type  were  expected to  affect 
memory for context words. Specifically, memory should be 
better for 6-s lists than for 2-s lists because participants have 
more time to develop, elaborate, and rehearse associations 
between  the  target  and  context  words  (Bugelski,  1962; 
Cooper & Pantie, 1967). Likewise, context memory should 
be better for related context words (i.e., category exemplars) 
than for unrelated context words because participants can 
take advantage of the prior association between target and 
context words to facilitate encoding, and because they can 
use categorical knowledge to guide retrieval and to generate 
candidate responses (e.g., Bower, Clark, Lesgold, & Win- 
zenz,  1969;  Mandler,  1967).  Data  consistent  with  both 
expectations have been reported in prior frequency studies. 
Lewandowsky and Smith (1983) and Williams and Durso 
(1986) found that recall for category exemplars improved as 
study time increased,  and  Begg  et al.  (1986)  found that 
same-category  context  words  were  recalled  better  than 
unrelated context words. 
Instructions were also expected to affect context memory. 
This expectation was based on the assumption that memory 
for context words would be related to the effort exerted to 
encode  them.  In  addition,  it  was  assumed  that  context 
memory participants would use their study time attempting 
to relate the context word to the target word in a memorable 
manner, that frequency participants would spend much of 
their  effort  monitoring  target-word  frequency,  and  that 
general memory participants might divide their attention, in 
some cases focusing on the target word and in others on the 
target-context  pair.  It  follows  that  memory  for  context 
words should be best in the context memory condition and 
worst in the frequency condition. Of interest, the current 
study  appears  to  be  the  first  to  compare  directly  the 
memorial consequences of studying a categorical frequency 
list under general memory and frequency instructions, and 
the only one to use context memory instructions. 
It is worth noting that frequency judgments produced by 
participants receiving general memory instructions are often 
similar  to  those  produced  by  participants  receiving  fre- 
quency  instructions  (Attig  &  Hasher,  1980;  Flexser  & 
Bower,  1974;  Greene,  1984;  Howell,  1973b;  Naveh- 
Benjamin &  Jonides,  1986;  Rose &  Rowe,  1976;  Zacks, 
Hasher, & Sanft, 1982).  2 Some researchers (e.g., Hasher & 
Zacks,  1979,  1984) have taken this  as evidence that fre- 
quency information of some sort accrues when people attend 
to repeated events and that this information reflects presenta- 
tion frequency with the same degree of faithfulness regard- 
less  of the type of study-phase instructions they receive. 
However, it is also true that different strategies operating on 
different representations can, under some conditions, yield 
identical estimates (e.g., Brown, 1995, Experiment 3). Thus, 
the  failure  to  find  an  instruction-type  effect  does  not 
preclude the possibility that study-phase instructions affect 
how  people process repeated events, how they represent 
event  frequency,  or  how  they  generate  their  frequency 
judgments. 
In summary, study time, target-context relatedness, and 
study-phase instructions were varied with the expectation 
that these factors, alone and in combination, would affect 
memory for context words.  It was  necessary to generate 
different levels of context memory to evaluate the hypoth- 
1  The low  level  of recall  observed in Experiment  3 made  it 
unnecessary  to conduct  the  obvious  fourth  experiment,  one in 
which participants studied unrelated pairs for 2.0 s each. 
2 But see Alba et al., 1980, Experiment 2; Hasher & Chromiak, 
1977, Experiment 1; and Williams & Durso, 1986, Experiment 2. 
In these experiments, participants receiving frequency (i.e., "inten- 
tional") instructions judged event frequencies more accurately than 
did those receiving general memory (i.e.,  "incidental") instruc- 
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esis that memory for event instances (which, in this case, is 
equivalent to memory for context words) is related to the use 
of enumeration-based estimation strategies. If this hypoth- 
esis is correct, the steepness of the response time function 
should be directly related to context memory; this function 
should  be  steepest  when  context  memory  is  best  and 
shallowest when it is worst. In addition, there should be a 
relation between estimation bias and context memory, with 
participants  tending  to  underestimate  event  frequencies, 
except when context memory is very poor. 
Experiment 1 
In this experiment, participants received context memory, 
general memory, or frequency instructions. They next stud- 
ied  a  list  of  target-context  word  pairs,  estimated  the 
presentation  frequency  of  the  target  words,  and  finally 
attempted to recall the context words. With the exception of 
the final cued-recall test, the general memory condition is 
identical to the variable-context condition used in an earlier 
study  (Brown,  1995).  Verbal  protocols  described  in  that 
study (Experiment 1) indicated that participants often used 
enumeration-based strategies (57%)  but that  nonenumera- 
tion strategies were also quite common  (43%).  If instruc- 
tions would affect context memory as expected (i.e., context 
memory participants would recall more context words than 
would general memory participants, who would recall more 
than  frequency  participants), and  if context  memory  and 
enumeration were related as expected, then context memory 
participants  should  enumerate  the  most  and  frequency 
participants should enumerate the least. This implies that the 
function relating response times to presentation frequency 
should  be  steepest in  the  context  memory  condition  and 
shallowest  in  the  frequency  condition.  If all  participants 
enumerate on some trials, event frequencies should typically 
be underestimated and the degree of underestimation should 
be unrelated to the study-phase instructions. 
Method 
Materials.  Participants studied a list of 260 word pairs. The 
first four word pairs presented in the study list served as a primacy 
buffer and the last four served as a recency buffer. Each buffer pair 
consisted of a target item (always a category label) and a context 
item (always a  category exemplar) that were not repeated else- 
where in the list and were not used as probes during frequency and 
cued-recail tests. 
Each of the 252 word pairs allocated to the body of the study list 
also consisted of a target word that identified a taxonomic category 
and a context word that identified a member of that category (e.g., 
SPORT-swimming, COUNTRY-Cuba, FISH-guppy).  Because each 
target  item  was  paired  with  a  different context  item  on  each 
presentation, and each context word was presented only once, each 
target-context pair was unique. Target words appearing in the body 
of the list were presented either 2, 4, 8,  12, or 16 times, with six 
target words assigned to each level of presentation frequency. 
The words used as target and context items were drawn from 
published category norms (Battig & Montague, 1969; McEvoy & 
Nelson, 1982). These norms made it possible to identify categories 
that could be described by a single noun (e.g., METAL, FLOWER, 
OCCUPATION) and that included a  reasonable number  of fre- 
quently listed category members. These one-word category names 
served as target items, and frequently listed one- and two-syllable 
category members as context items. Each category was assigned to 
a single level of presentation frequency depending on the availabil- 
ity of suitable context items. 
A  unique  study  list  was  created  for  each  general  memory 
participant and  was presented to  that participant and to yoked 
participants from the context memory and frequency groups. In all 
cases, the target-context pairs were assigned positions such that the 
repeated presentations of a given target word were evenly distrib- 
uted across the list, and such that target items repeated at a given 
level of presentation frequency were not over or underrepresented 
in any portion of the list. In addition, each study list had the target 
items arranged in a unique random order, and each used a different 
random  ordering of the  context items  (for details, see  Brown, 
1995). 
Test lists were composed of the 30 target items and six category 
labels that did not appear in the study list. The latter served as 
0-frequency catch trials. A different test list was constructed for 
each yoked triad in the following manner. First, the list was divided 
into six blocks, with one target item from each frequency level (0, 
2, 4, 8,  12, 16) randomly assigned to each block. Then, the target 
words were randomly ordered within blocks. A similar scheme was 
used to create the test booklets for the cued-recail test. 
Procedure.  Prior  to  the  presentation  of  the  study  phase, 
participants in all groups were told that they would see 260 word 
pairs, that each pair would consist of a target word and a context 
word, and that the target words but not the context words would be 
repeated. In addition, all participants were instructed to study the 
pairs for a  later memory test, though only context memory and 
frequency participants were informed of the type of test they would 
receive.  Specifically, the  cued-memory  task  was  described  to 
participants in the context memory group, and these participants 
were  advised  to  commit  each  target-context pair  to  memory. 
Participants in the frequency groups were informed that knowledge 
of target-word frequency would be tested and were advised to pay 
close attention to how often each target word appeared in the study 
list. 
During the study phase, the target-cuntext pairs were displayed 
one at a time, for 5.5 s on a computer-controlled  video monitor. The 
target item always appeared in the center of the screen in uppercase 
letters, and the context item always appeared two lines beneath in 
lowercase letters. After the 5.5-s study interval, the screen was 
erased and  remained  blank  (except for  markers  indicating the 
screen positions of the target word and context word, and a trial 
counter) for 0.5 s. 
Following the study phase, participants were insmacted that they 
would be presented with 36 category names and that they would be 
required to estimate as accurately as possible the number of times 
each had appeared in the previous list. Participants were informed 
that decision times would be collected. They were also warned that 
some test items did not appear during the study phase and in this 
way were informed of the lower bound of the response range. The 
upper bound of the response range, however, was left unspecified. 
The participant initiated each trial by pressing the enter key on 
the computer keyboard. This caused a target word to appear in the 
center of the computer display. The participant was required to 
decide how many times it had appeared in the study list and to press 
the keyboard's space bar just as soon as he or she had "a single 
numerical response in mind," but not before. When the space bar 
was pressed, a response field appeared two lines beneath the test 
word.  At this  point,  the  participant entered an  estimate at  the 
keyboard and pressed the enter key. The test word, response field, 
and  frequency  estimates  were  then  erased  and  replaced by  a 
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Each trial yielded a decision time, an initiation time, and an entry 
t/me. The decision time interval began with the presentation of the 
test word and ended when the participant pressed the space bar. 
This interval was particularly important because it indicated how 
long it took the participant to formulate an estimate. The initiation 
interval began as soon as the space bar was pressed and ended as 
soon as the first digit was typed, and the entry interval began when 
the initiation interval terminated and ended when the enter key was 
pressed.  In combination, initiation  and entry time  indicated the 
time required to enter an estimate once it had been formulated. 
The first six trials  were treated  as practice trials.  During these 
trials, the experimenter sat with the participant and made sure he or 
she understocxi the task and the test procedure. 
A cued-recall test followed the frequency test. Each participant 
was given a booklet that listed the 36 target words, 12 to a page. 
Participants  were reminded that most of the target words had been 
paired with multiple context words during the study phase, and 
they were insu~cted to recall as many of these context words as 
they could. Specifically,  participants  were asked to work through 
the booklet one target word at a time at their own pace and to 
respond by listing  all the context words that were paired with it 
during the study phase. 
Parlieipants.  Ninety undergraduates were recruited from the 
University of Alberta subject pool. Thirty of these were randomly 
assigned to each group. Participants  were tested individually in 
sessions  lasting about 50 min, and they received course credit for 
their cooperation. 
Results 
Cued recall.  For each participant and cuing target word, 
cued  recall  was  scored  by  using  both  lenient  and  strict 
criteria.  When  the  lenient  criterion  was  applied,  all  re- 
sponses were summed to produce a total recall score. When 
the  strict criterion was applied,  only words that had been 
paired  with the cuing target word during  the  study phase 
were summed into a  correct recall score. Only total recall 
scores are reported below. There were two reasons for this. 
First,  the  two  measures  produced  an  identical  pattern  of 
effects.  Second,  total  recall  seemed  a  better  indicator  of 
subjective list knowledge because it reflects both true and 
false beliefs  about the  list,  whereas  correct recall  reflects 
only true  beliefs  (Bruce  et  al.,  1991; Williams  &  Durso, 
1986). 
A  mean  total  recall  measure  was  computed  for  each 
participant and each level of presentation frequency. These 
means were submitted to an Instructions (context memory 
vs. general memory vs. frequency) x  Frequency (0, 2, 4, 8, 
12,  16)  analysis  of variance  (ANOVA), where the former 
was treated as a between-subjects variable and the latter as a 
within-subjects variable. 
Mean total recall is plotted against presentation frequency 
in Figure 1 (left panel), and percentage recall for each group 
is listed in Table  1. As predicted,  study-phase instructions 
affected context memory, F(2,  87)  =  5.12, MSE  =  4.65. 
(Unless otherwise noted, the significance level was set at .05 
for all  analyses  reported  in  this  article.)  On  average,  the 
context memory participants recalled 115.3 words (equal to 
46%  of the  252  context  words  associated  with  the  target 
words);  the  general  memory  participants  recalled  100.8 
words (40%);  and the frequency participants  recalled 89.1 
words  (35%).  In  addition,  there  was  a  main  effect  of 
frequency, F(5,435)  =  437.21, MSE =  0.83, indicating that 
more  words  were  recalled  when  the  target  word  was 
presented  with  many  context  words  than  when  it  was 
presented  with  few.  Finally,  there  was  a  reliable  Instruc- 
tions  ×  Frequency interaction, F(10, 435)  =  4.18, MSE = 
0.83, indicating that the effect of instruction type was most 
pronounced at higher presentation frequencies. 
Decision  times.  During  the  frequency  task,  each  re- 
sponse  period  was  divided  between  a  decision  time,  an 
initiation time, and an entry time. These three measures were 
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Table I 
Mean Percentages Recalled, Response Times (in Seconds), Regression Slopes, and Correlations for Experiments I-3 
Percentage recalled  Response time  Slope"  Correlation b 
Instrucdons  Exp. 1  Exp. 2  Exp. 3  Exp. 1  Exp. 2  Exp. 3  Exp. 1  Exp. 2  Exp. 3  Exp. 1  Exp. 2  Exp. 3 
Context  46  28  15  6.3  4.9  3.7  0.59  0.55  0.81  .93  .86  .83 
General  40  27  12  4.8  5.4  4.5  0.64  0.55  0.96  .93  .83  .83 
Frequency  35  23  10  4.3  4.0  4.2  0.86  0.76  1.08  .93  .84  .88 
M  40  26  12  5.1  4.8  4.1  0.70  0.62  0.95  .93  .84  .85 
Note.  Exp. = experiment. 
"Estimated against actual frequency,  bBack-transformed; estimated with actual frequency. 
indicated how long it took to generate and enter a frequency 
estimate. Thus,  there  were 4  response time measures per 
trial.  Because the  first 6  trials  were treated as  a  practice 
block, response times and estimates collected during these 
trials were discarded. The remaining 30 trials included five 
items  at  each  level  of presentation  frequency.  For  each 
participant and each response time measure, a mean and a 
median  were  computed  for  each  level  of  presentation 
frequency.  These  measures  were  submitted  to  separate 
Instructions ×  Frequency ANOVAs, although only analyses 
performed on decision time means are presented in detail 
below. There are, however, a  few points concerning these 
auxiliary  analyses  that  are  worth  noting.  First,  for  all 
measures, means and medians were  similar in  magnitude 
and  displayed  the  identical  pattern  of  effects.  Second, 
participants  typically initiated  and entered their responses 
rapidly. In the present experiment, the mean initiation and 
entry times were 0.8  s and 0.7  s, respectively. Third, both 
initiation and entry time increased slightly (no more than 0.6 
s) across the range of presentation frequencies. Fourth, the 
total time analysis displayed the same pattern of effects as 
the decision time analysis. Finally, the preceding points are 
valid not only for the current experiment, but for two prior 
experiments (Brown, 1995, Experiments 2 and 3) and for the 
two experiments that follow. 
Mean  decision  time is plotted against presentation  fre- 
quency  in  Figure  2  (left  panel).  As  this  figure  suggests, 
response times increased with presentation frequency, F(5, 
435)  =  53.48,  MSE =  9.14,  and both the main effect of 
instruction type, F(2,  87)  =  3.34, MSE =  56.69,  and the 
Instruction  ×  Frequency  interaction,  F(10,  435)  =  3.25, 
MSE =  9.14, were reliable. This interaction is particularly 
noteworthy  because  it  indicates  that  the  response  time 
function was the  steepest when context memory was best 
(i.e., in the context memory condition)  and the shallowest 
when it was the worst (i.e., in the frequency condition). This 
is  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  enumeration-based 
estimates become less common as context retrieval becomes 
more difficult. 
Frequency  estimates.  As with the response times,  the 
first 6 estimates produced by a participant were discarded, 
and statistics were derived from the remaining 30 responses. 
For each participant and level of target frequency, a mean 
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mated frequency -  actual frequency  b were computed? Two 
additional  measures  were computed for each participant. 
The first was  the  slope obtained by regressing  estimated 
frequency against actual frequency. These slopes provided a 
measure  of estimation  bias,  with  slopes  greater than  1.0 
indicating a tendency to overestimate event frequencies and 
slopes less than 1.0 indicating a tendency to underestimate 
them. The second was the rank order correlation between 
estimated and actual frequency. These correlations provided 
a measure of how well participants discriminate between the 
frequency levels, independent of their ability to accurately 
induce the metric properties of the response range (Brown & 
Siegler, 1993; Flexser & Bower, 1974; Naveh-Benjamin & 
Jonides,  1986).  The  estimate  means  and  absolute  error 
means were submitted to separate Instructions ×  Frequency 
ANOVAs,  and  the  slopes  and  correlations  to  separate 
one-way (Instructions) ANOVAs.  4 
Estimated  frequency means  are  presented  in  Table  2. 
These data indicate that participants in all groups tended to 
underestimate event frequencies, but not to the same extent. 
Specifically, estimates produced by frequency participants 
were less biased than those produced by the context memory 
and  general  memory  participants.  Consistent  with  this 
observation, the Instructions  ×  Frequency interaction was 
significant, F(10, 435) =  5.50, MSE =  5.09; as were the two 
main effects for instructions, F(2, 87) =  6.00, MSE =  17.09, 
and  for  frequency,  F(5,  435)  =  327.70,  MSE  =  5.09. 
Regression  slopes  reflected the  same  pattern  of relative 
underestimation; the mean regression slope was 0.86 for the 
frequency condition, 0.64 for the general memory condition, 
and 0.59 for the context memory condition, F(2, 87) =  6.26, 
MSE  =  0.103.  A  set  of least  significant difference tests 
confirmed that the frequency condition slopes differed from 
the context memory and general memory conditions, which 
did not differ from each other. 
Estimates  produced  by  context  memory  and  general 
memory participants were more biased than those produced 
by participants in the frequency group, but not less accurate. 
Evidence for this can be found in Table 1, which lists the 
mean rank order correlations, and in Table 2,  which lists 
absolute error means. The mean correlations listed in Table 1 
(.93 for each group) make it clear that participants had an 
accurate understanding of relative event frequency and that 
this understanding was unaffected by study-phase instruc- 
tions. Instructions also had no effect on absolute error (see 
Table 2), as neither the main effect of instructions, F(2, 87) = 
1.30,  MSE  =  4.53,  nor  the  Instructions  X  Frequency 
interaction, F(10, 435) =  1.06, MSE =  1.69, was significant. 
There was,  however, a  reliable main effect of frequency, 
F(5, 435) =  378.81, MSE =  1.69, indicating that estimates 
for high-frequency items were less accurate than estimates 
for low-frequency items. 
Discussion 
In  the  current experiment,  study-phase  instructions  af- 
fected participants' memory for the context words, the speed 
with  which  they  estimated  event  frequencies,  and  the 
magnitude  of the  estimates  they  produced. As  expected, 
cued recall was best following context memory instructions 
and worst following frequency instructions. Likewise, the 
response time function was steepest in the context memory 
condition and shallowest in the frequency condition. These 
results are consistent with the notion that people use both 
enumeration-based and nonenumeration estimation strate- 
gies and that they are more likely to enumerate when event 
memory is good than when it is not. The general tendency 
for participants to underestimate event frequencies in this 
experiment is also consistent with the notion that strategy 
selection and context memory are related (Brown, 1995). As 
noted  above,  underestimation  appears  to  be  a  necessary 
consequence of enumeration both because forgetting may 
lead to conservative enumeration-based estimates and be- 
cause these estimates may be used to infer a conservative 
response range. 
Although underestimation was  expected in this experi- 
ment, the  tendency for frequency participants  to produce 
less  biased  estimates  than  context  memory  and  general 
memory  participants  was  not.  There  are  two  plausible 
explanations  for  this:  an  averaging  explanation  and  a 
frequency-coding explanation. The averaging explanation 
assumes that some frequency participants ignored the con- 
text  words  during  the  study  phase.  As  a  result,  these 
participants  would  not  be  able  to  enumerate  during  the 
frequency test and, instead, would have to rely on nonenu- 
meration strategies.  Brown (1995) has found that partici- 
pants who do not enumerate often adopt a response range 
that is considerably wider than the stimulus range, which 
leads to overestimation. Assuming some participants enumer- 
ated  and  others  relied on  nonenumeration  strategies,  the 
relatively steep regression slope observed in the frequency 
condition  could  have  been  produced  by  averaging  the 
shallow  slopes  associated  with  the  former and  the  steep 
slopes associated with the latter. 
The second explanation assumes that frequency partici- 
pants, unlike (or to a greater extent than) context memory 
and  general  memory  participants,  attended  to  event fre- 
quency during the study phase. Although it seems unlikely 
that they would have been able to maintain an accurate running 
tally for all target words, they may have attempted to keep track 
of a few of the most commonly presented items (Alba et al., 
1980; Fie×set & Bower, 1974; Zacks et al., 1982). If so, these 
participants  could  have  used  these  counts  to  accurately 
define an upper bound for the response range and may have 
extrapolated more aggressively when they did enumerate. 
There is evidence that argues against the averaging position 
and that favors the frequency-coding position. First, the averag- 
ing  position  predicts  that  estimated  frequency should  be 
inversely  related  to  response  time:  On  average,  partici- 
3 In this  experiment  and  following  ones,  medians  were  also 
computed and analyzed. These data are not reported because, in all 
cases, means and medians were similar in size and displayed the 
identical pattern of effects. 
4 All  correlations  were  transformed  by using  Fisher's  r-to-z 
method before being  submitted to statistical tests,  and  a back- 
transformation was used to compute the correlation means reported 
below (Silver & Dunlap, 1987). 906  BROWN 
Table 2 
Mean Estimated Frequencies and Absolute Errors  for Levels 
of Presentation  Frequency for Experiments 1-3 
Experiment 1  Experiment 2  Experiment 3 
Freq.  Con.  Gen.  Freq.  Con.  Gen.  Freq.  Con.  G-en.  Freq. 
Estimatedfreq. 
0  -  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2 
2  2.0  1.9  2.0  1.8  2.0  2.2  3.0  3.0  3.3 
4  3.6  3.3  3.8  3.2  4.2  4.2  6.2  5.6  5.9 
8  5.8  5.7  6.9  6.1  6.3  7.5  9.8  10.3  9.5 
12  7.9  7.6  9.7  7.3  6.7  10.5  11.3  12.5  15.2 
16  9.7  10.8  14.5  9.1  9.7  12.1  13.7  15.9  17.3 
M  4.8  4.9  6.2  4.6  4.9  5.2  7.4  7.9  8.6 
Absolutee~or 
0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2 
2  0.5  0.7  0.6  1.1  1.4  1.7  2.2  2.2  2.3 
4  1.0  1.3  1.4  2.0  2.9  3.0  3.8  3.5  3.5 
8  2.5  3.0  2.9  3.9  3.9  3.9  5.4  5.6  4.3 
12  4.8  5.1  4.6  6.2  5.9  5.4  6.2  7.0  7.8 
16  6.7  7.5  6.4  8.4  8.8  7.0  8.4  8.1  7.2 
M  2.6  2.9  2.7  3.6  3.8  3.5  4.4  4.5  4.2 
Note.  Freq. = frequency; con. = context; gen. = general. 
pants who enumerate should respond slowly and underesti- 
mate,  and  those  who  rely  on  nonenumeratign  strategies 
should respond rapidly and overestimate. The data provide 
no support for this prediction; the correlation between mean 
estimated frequency and mean decision time computed over 
the 30 frequency participants was. 12. Comparable correla- 
tions  computed  over  the  context  memory  and  general 
memory participants were. 13 and -.06, respectively (in all 
cases, p  >  .1). Second, the averaging hypothesis predicts a 
bimodal distribution  of slopes in the frequency condition, 
with  slopes  obtained  from  the  enumerating  participants 
forming the lower mode and those obtained from nonenumer- 
ating participants forming the higher one. There was also no 
support for this prediction because a Lilliefors test indicated 
that this  distribution  of slopes did not differ significantly 
from  normality.  Evidence  in  support  of  the  frequency- 
coding position came from a questionnaire administered to 
all participants  following the  cued-recall test.  Of the  fre- 
quency  participants,  93%  claimed that  they  attempted to 
keep track of how frequently the  target words  were pre- 
sented,  whereas only 43%  of the general memory partici- 
pants and 30% of the context memory participants made the 
same claim. Experiment 2 provides additional evidence for 
the frequency-coding explanation. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, except that 
participants had only 2 s to study each word pair rather than 
6 s. Because recall is often related to study time (Bugelski, 
1962; Cooper & Pantie,  1967; Williams & Durso,  1986), it 
was expected that context memory would be worse in this 
experiment than in the last and that as a result, enumeration- 
based estimates would be less common and response time 
functions less steep. As in Experiment 1, participants were 
expected  to  underestimate  event  frequencies,  and  on  the 
basis  of the  results  of Experiment  1,  this  tendency  was 
expected to be greater in the context memory and general 
memory conditions  than in  the  frequency condition.  This 
prediction  assumed  that  differences  in  frequency  coding 
explained  between-group  differences  in  estimation  bias 
observed  in  Experiment  1.  However,  if  the  averaging 
explanation was correct and context memory was worse in 
this experiment than the last, then participants in all groups 
should  be less biased  to  underestimate  event frequencies 
than their Experiment 1 counterparts. 
Method 
Design, materials, and procedure.  With  one  exception,  the 
design, materials,  and procedure  were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1. In this experiment, each word was displayed for 1.5 
s, followed by a 0.5-s intertrial interval. Thus, participants had 2.0 
s, rather than 6.0 s, to study each word pair. 
Participants.  Ninety participants were recruited from the Uni- 
versity of Alberta subject pool and randomly assigned to the three 
study-phase instruction groups. Participants were tested individu- 
ally in  sessions lasting  about 35 min,  and they received  course 
credit for their participation. 
Results 
Recall  data,  response  times,  and  estimation  data  were 
summarized and analyzed as in Experiment 1. 
Cued recall.  The total recall data are presented in Figure 
1 (center panel) and in Table 1. In some respects, these data 
resemble those  obtained  in  Experiment  1,  though  as  ex- 
pected, reducing study time impaired memory for context 
words.  As  before,  the  main of effect of instructions  was 
significant, F(2,  87)  =  3.12, MSE =  2.30,  and frequency 
participants  recalled  the  least  (M =  23%)  and  context CONTEXT MEMORY AND STRATEGY  SELECTION  907 
memory participants the most (M =  28%). However, unlike 
Experiment 1, recall following general memory instructions 
(M =  27%) was almost as good as recall following context 
memory instructions. Frequency had a  large effect on the 
number of words recalled, F(5,435) =  273.50, MSE =  0.45, 
and interacted marginally with instructions, F(10, 435)  = 
1.73, p <. 1, MSE =  0.45. 
Decision  ames.  Assuming  that  context  memory  and 
enumeration  are  related,  the  cued-recall  data  imply  that 
response time functions should be shallower in this experi- 
ment than in the last, that the shallowest function should 
appear in the frequency condition, and that response times 
should  be  similar  in  the  context  memory  and  general 
memory conditions. Means plotted in Figure 2 (center panel) 
are  consistent with  these  implications.  It is  obvious  that 
participants in this experiment responded more rapidly than 
their counterparts did in Experiment  1 (cf. Figure 2,  left 
panel; also see Table 1). It is also clear that response time 
functions produced by context memory and general memory 
participants were similar to one another and that they were 
steeper than the one produced by the frequency participants. 
This pattern of means produced a  reliable Instructions  × 
Frequency interaction, F(10, 435) =  2.41, MSE =  4.78. The 
main effect of frequency, F(5, 435) =  26.30, MSE =  4.78, 
was also significant, though the main effect of instructions 
was not, F(2, 87) =  1.88, MSE =  50.80. 
Frequency  estimates.  As  in  the  last  experiment, esti- 
mated frequency tended to be smaller than actual frequency, 
particularly for high-frequency items, and this tendency was 
greater for context memory and general memory participants 
than for frequency participants. This difference was reflected 
in the regression slopes that were steeper in the frequency 
condition (M =  0.76)  than  in  either the  context memory 
condition  (M =  0.55)  or  the  general  memory  condition 
(M =  0.55), F(2, 87)  =  5.16, MSE =  0.08 (see Table  1). 
This difference is also apparent in the pattern of estimate 
means  displayed in Table 2.  The ANOVA performed on 
these  means  indicated that  the  Instructions  ×  Frequency 
interaction, F(10, 435) =  3.48, MSE =  5.87, the instructions 
effect, F(2, 87) =  3.12, MSE =  37.82, and the frequency 
effect, F(5,435) =  229.33, MSE =  5.87, were all reliable. 
Although study-phase instructions affected response times 
and  estimation  bias,  they  had  only  a  limited  effect on 
absolute accuracy and no effect on relative accuracy. Specifi- 
cally, there was a reliable Instructions x  Frequency interac- 
tion for absolute error, F(10, 435)  =  2.42, MSE =  3.08, 
indicating that frequency  participants estimated the values of 
high-frequency items more accurately than participants did 
in other groups (see Table 2). As before, the main effect of 
frequency, F(5, 435)  =  249.82, MSE =  3.08, was signifi- 
cant,  indicating  that  absolute  error increased  with  event 
frequency, and the main effect  of instruction type, F(2, 87) < 
1.0, was not significant. In this experiment, participants were 
good  at  discriminating  levels  of presentation  frequency, 
though  not  as  good  as in  Experiment  I;  the  correlation 
means  were  .86,  .83,  and  .84,  for  the  context memory, 
general  memory,  and  frequency  groups,  respectively, 
F(2, 87) <  1.0. 
Discussion 
Reducing study time from 6 s to 2 s affected both context 
memory  and  response  times.  As  expected,  participants 
recalled fewer context words in this experiment than in the 
last, and they responded more rapidly. Study-phase instruc- 
tions  also  affected these  measures;  as  in  Experiment  1, 
frequency participants  recalled fewer context words  and 
responded more rapidly than context memory and general 
memory  participants.  These  relations  between  encoding 
factors (study time and study-phase instructions), context 
memory, and response time provide support for the view that 
participants used both enumeration-based and nonenumera- 
tion  estimation  strategies  and  that  strategy  selection  is 
related to the availability of relevant event instances. 
The  pattern  of estimation  bias  was  the  same  in  this 
experiment  as  in  the  last.  Again,  participants  tended  to 
underestimate  event frequencies,  and  this  tendency  was 
more pronounced for context memory and general memory 
participants  than  for  frequency participants.  In  addition, 
participants in the present experiment produced estimates 
that were as small if not smaller than those produced by their 
counterparts in Experiment 1 (Table 2). As in Experiment 1, 
it appears that context memory and general memory partici- 
pants enumerated at least some of the time and that they used 
their conservative enumeration-based estimates to establish 
a  relatively  narrow  response  range.  It  also  appears  that 
frequency participants rarely enumerated and that they kept 
count of the frequency of some items and used these counts 
to select a boundary for the response range that was close to 
the  upper bound  of the  stimulus  range,  s  Note that these 
results  are  incompatible with the  averaging proposal de- 
scribed  above  that  incorrectly  predicted  that  regression 
slopes should have been steeper in the present experiment 
than in the last. 
The current experiment produced one unexpected result. 
In contrast to Experiment 1, cued recall was no better in the 
context  memory  condition  than  in  the  general  memory 
condition. This suggests that context memory participants in 
this experiment did not have the time required to elaborate or 
rehearse target--context associations  in  a  way  that would 
produce superior memory performance. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 1 except that 
target items  were  paired  with  random  nouns  rather than 
category exemplars during the study phase. It was expected 
that context memory would be much worse in this experi- 
ment than in Experiment 1. After all, participants were given 
only  one  trial  to  learn  more  than  250  unrelated  paired 
associates. Poor context memory should compel participants 
5 The pattern of moderate underestimation combined with a very 
shallow response time function is identical to one observed in a 
previous experiment (Brown, 1995, Experiment 3). In this experi- 
ment, participants studied consistent-context word pairs and were 
informed by the experimenter that the upper bound of the response 
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to rely on nonenumeration strategies. If so, response times 
should be fast, response time functions flat, and underestima- 
tion less pronounced in this experiment than in Experiments 
1 and2. 
Me~od 
Design,  materials,  and procedure.  With  one exception,  the 
design,  materials,  and procedure  were identical to those used in 
Experiment  1. In this  experiment,  category  exemplars  were not 
used as context words. Instead, each context word was replaced by 
a one- or two-syllable word that had no obvious relation to its target 
word (e.g., INSTRUMENT-fence, CURRENCY--claw,  APPIdANCE- 
jury, ...)  and  that  was not  an exemplar of any other  category 
described by a target word. 
Participants.  Ninety participants were recruited from the Uni- 
versity of Alberta and randomly assigned to the three study-phase 
instruction groups. Participants were tested individually in sessions 
lasting  about 50 mill, and  they received  course  credit  for their 
cooperation.  One  person  in  the  general  memory  group  was 
eliminated because his mean estimate was 3 SDs greater than the 
mean for his group, and his regression slope was 5 SDs greater. 
Results 
Recall  data,  response  times,  and  estimation  data  were 
summarized and analyzed as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Cued  recall.  As  expected,  participants  had  difficulty 
remembering the context words. Mean total cued recall was 
15%, 12%, and, 10% for context memory, general memory, 
and frequency conditions, respectively. Although, the main 
effect of instructions was only marginally significant, F(2, 
86)  =  2.39, p  <  .1, MSE =  1.90,  both the main effect of 
frequency level, F(5, 430)  =  128.50, MSE =  0.31, and the 
Instructions  ×  Frequency interaction,  F(10,  430)  =  2.37, 
MSE  =  0.31,  were  reliable.  These  effects  indicate  that 
participants recalled more context words when cued with 
frequently presented target words than with rarely presented 
target words and that this tendency was most pronounced in 
the context memory condition and least pronounced in the 
frequency condition (see Figure 1, right panel). 
Decision  times.  The  cued-recall  data  indicate  that  all 
participants had limited access to relevant event instances. It 
follows that enumeration-based estimates should be uncom- 
mon  in  all  conditions  and,  hence,  that  response  time 
functions  should  be  shallow  and  should  resemble  one 
another. The decision time means plotted in Figure 2 (right 
panel)  bear out these  predictions.  In contrast to the  prior 
experiments,  neither  the  main  effect  of  instructions, 
F(2,  86)  =  1.01,  MSE  =  24.68,  nor  the  Instructions  × 
Frequency interaction, F(10, 430) =  1.03, MSE =  2.24, was 
significant.  There was, however, a  reliable main effect of 
frequency,  F(5,  430)  =  20.57,  MSE  =  2.24.  Averaging 
across  groups,  mean  decision  times  for the  six  levels of 
presentation frequency (i.e., 0, 2, 4, 8, 12, 16) were 2.9 s, 3.9 
s, 4.1  s, 4.3 s, 4.7 s, and 5.0 s. In other words, decision time 
increased by 1.1 s as presentation frequency increased from 
2 to 16. By comparison, response times increased by 7.5 s 
across the same range in the context memory condition in 
Experiment  1.  Thus,  although  response  times  increased 
slightly, the modest size of this increase, in conjunction with 
the difficulty participants had recalling context words, make 
it unlikely that enumeration-based estimates were common. 
Frequency estimates.  As in Experiments 1 and 2, partici- 
pants  tended  to  underestimate  event  frequency,  and  this 
tendency was more pronounced in the context memory and 
general memory conditions than in the frequency condition. 
Estimates produced in the current experiment diverged from 
this  pattern  in  two  respects.  First,  estimated  frequencies 
tended to be as large if not larger than actual frequencies. 
Second, study-phase instructions did not have a consistent 
effect on estimation bias. The tendency to produce relatively 
unbiased  estimates  is  evident  in  the  means  presented  in 
Table 2. Averaging across conditions, estimate means for the 
six frequency levels (0, 2, 4, 8, 12, 16) were 0.2, 3.1, 5.9, 9.9, 
13.0,  and 15.6,  F(5, 430) =  179.97, MSE =  17.34,  and the 
average  regression  slope  was  .95.  Although  the  Instruc- 
tions ×  Frequency interaction (see Table 2) was significant, 
F(10,  430)  =  1.91,  MSE  --  112.80,  it  was  considerably 
smaller in this experiment than in Experiments 1 and 2. Of 
more importance, instructions did not have a reliable effect 
on the regression slopes, F(2, 86) =  1.74, MSE =  0.31 (see 
Table  1),  or  on  the  overall  magnitude  of the  estimates, 
F(2, 86) <  1.0 (see Table 2). 
In the  current  experiment,  only presentation  frequency 
had a  reliable effect on absolute error (see Table 2), F(5, 
430) =  79.25, MSE =  9.48; for instructions, F(2, 86) <  1.0; 
for Instructions  ×  Frequency, F(10, 430)  =  1.0. Although 
study-phase  instructions  did  not  affect absolute  accuracy, 
they did have a reliable effect on relative accuracy. Specifi- 
cally, the mean rank order correlation between estimated and 
actual  frequency  was  larger  in  the  frequency  condition 
(M =  .88) than in the context memory or general memory 
conditions  (M =  .83,  in  both  cases);  F(2,  86)  =  3.43, 
MSE =  0.08. 
Discussion 
In this experiment, cued recall was very poor, response 
time  functions  were  shallow,  frequency judgments  were 
relatively unbiased, and study-phase instructions had little if 
any effect on response times or context memory. This pattern 
indicates  that enumeration-based strategies were rarely, if 
ever, used and is consistent with the position that instance 
memory and strategy selection are related.  In this case, it 
appears that context memory was so poor that most partici- 
pants were unable or unwilling to enumerate on most trials. 
This  suggests  that  context  memory  must  exceed  some 
threshold before enumeration is perceived to be an effective 
estimation  strategy  and  that  below  this  threshold,  event 
retrieval  may  be  too  difficult  or  unreliable  to  support 
enumeration.  The  current  experiment  demonstrates  that 
subthreshold recall levels can occur even when people have 
studied  a  list of unique  event instances  and,  in  so doing, 
indicates that it is the accessibility to event instances rather 
than their distinctiveness per se that determines whether an 
enumeration-based strategy will be used (cf. Brown,  1995; 
Conrad et al., in press; Menon, 1993). CONTEXT MEMORY AND STRATEGY  SELECTION  909 
R  is  interesting  that  the  mean  rank  order  correlation 
between estimated and actual frequency was highest in the 
frequency condition, indicating that frequency participants 
developed a better sense of relative event frequency than did 
context  memory  or  general  memory  participants.  This 
finding is important because it provides additional evidence 
that warning people about an upcoming frequency test can, 
under  some  conditions,  affect their  knowledge  of event 
frequency (cf. Hasher &  Zacks,  1984). Of course, study- 
phase instructions and relative accuracy were not related in 
Experiments 1 or 2. Apparently, deliberate encoding strate- 
gies can only be used effectively when people have sufficient 
time to execute them (cf. Experiment 2), and the effects of 
intentional  encoding  can  only be  observed when  perfor- 
mance is not at ceiling in the incidental-learning condition(s) 
(cf. Experiment 1), 
General Discussion 
Context Memory and Response Times 
The primary aim of the present study was to establish a 
relation between  context memory and  strategy  selection. 
Specifically, this research was designed to determine whether 
people are more likely to enumerate when instance memory 
is  good than  when it is  not. To evaluate this  hypothesis 
study-phase  instructions,  study  time,  and  target-context 
relatedness  were  manipulated,  and  response  times,  fre- 
quency estimates, and cued-recall data were collected. The 
expectations were that instructional differences and stimulus 
properties would affect context memory, that enumeration- 
based  estimates  would  be  most  common  when  context 
memory was the best, and that such estimates would become 
less  common  as  encoding  factors  reduced  participants' 
memory for context words. These expectations, in conjunc- 
tion  with  prior  findings  that  related  response  times  to 
strategy usage, gave rise to the prediction that the function 
relating response times to presentation frequency would be 
the steepest when context memory was the best and that 
these functions would flatten out as context memory de- 
clines. 
The analyses presented above demonstrate that response 
times and context memory are related. However, because 
only study-phase instructions were manipulated within ex- 
periment, it was not possible to examine this relationship 
across  the  full range of recall performance. Nonetheless, 
data plotted in Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the steepness of 
the response time functions and level of context memory 
were related across experiments as well as within experi- 
ment. This point is made more clearly in Figure 3. In this 
figure,  a  measure  of the  steepness  of the  response  time 
function,  called  the  response time  difference,  is  plotted 
against mean probability of recall for each group and each 
experiment. The response time difference was computed by 
subtracting the average decision time for the low-frequency 
items (i.e., target words presented 2 and 4 times) from the 
average decision  time for the high-frequency items  (i.e., 
target  words  presented  12  and  16  times).  This  measure 
controls  for  incidental  between-group  differences,  while 
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experiments, excluding data from the frequency groups in Experiments 1 and 2. 910  BROWN 
providing an indication of the degree to which estimates for 
high-frequency items tended to be slower than estimates for 
low-frequency  items.  Regardless  of  the  exact  shape  or 
intercept of the response time function, the response time 
difference  should  be  large  when  the  function  increases 
steeply with presentation frequency, and small when it does 
not.  6 
A number of things should be noted about Figure 3. First, 
there were large differences in both context memory and in 
the steepness of the response time function, with probability 
of recall  ranging  from  10%  to  46%  and  response  time 
differences  ranging  from  0.6  s  to  6.0  s.  Second,  within 
experiment, there was a strong tendency for response time 
differences to increase  with recall, particularly in Experi- 
ments  1 and 2, in which the linear relation between recall 
and  response  time  difference  was  virtually  perfect  (see 
Figure  3A).  Third,  across  experiments,  recall  was  a  very 
good  predictor  of  response  time  differences;  when  the 
response  time  differences  were  regressed  against  mean 
recall, a linear model accounted for 83% of the variance, and 
a quadratic model accounted for 94%. 
An examination of the data plotted in Figure 3A suggests 
that one reason fits were not better was that the response 
time differences obtained for the  frequency conditions  in 
Experiments  1 and 2 were smaller than might be expected 
given the availability of context words. This can be seen by 
comparing the Experiment 1 frequency condition with the 
Experiment 2 context memory and general memory condi- 
tions, and by comparing the Experiment 2 frequency condi- 
tion with all conditions in Experiment 3. In both cases, recall 
was considerably better in the frequency condition than in 
conditions  yielding comparable response time differences. 
The relatively flat response time functions observed in the 
frequency  conditions  in  Experiments  1  and  2  can  be 
explained as follows. In principle, retrieving a single number 
directly  from  memory  should  be  easier  and  faster  than 
retrieving and counting multiple instances (Menon,  1993). 
As a result, people shouM prefer direct retrieval to enumera- 
tion-based  strategies  when  they  have  access  to  both  a 
prestored frequency count and retrievable event instances. In 
other words, it may be that the use of enumeration-based 
strategies not only increases with the availability of retriev- 
able  event  instances  but  that  it  also  decreases  with  the 
availability of retrievable frequency counts. Thus, holding 
context memory constant, response times should be faster 
when people have access to prestored frequency counts than 
when they do not. 
Differences in the magnitude of the frequency estimates 
observed in Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that participants 
in the frequency groups directly coded and later retrieved 
frequency counts, at least some of the time. This implies that 
the  response  time functions  observed in  these  conditions 
should  be  shallow  relative  to  the  functions  produced  by 
participants who did not directly encode frequency counts, 
but who had a reasonably good memory for event instances 
(i.e.,  those  in  the  context  memory  and  general  memory 
groups in Experiments 1 and 2). It also correctly implies that 
recall  should  be  more  predictive  of  enumeration  in  the 
context memory and general memory conditions than in the 
frequency condition because prestored counts should only 
be available to compete with retrieval traces in the frequency 
conditions.  When  data  from the  frequency  conditions  in 
Experiments  1  and  2  were  excluded  and  response  time 
differences were again regressed against recall, the linear fit 
accounted  for 95%  of the  variance,  and  the  quadratic  fit 
accounted for 99% (see Figure 3B). 
In brief, the present analysis demonstrates the existence of 
a  strong systematic relation between context memory and 
response time. This relation is interpreted as indicating that 
people are more likely to enumerate when event instances 
are readily available than when they are not. In addition, the 
nonlinear aspect of this function suggests that there may be a 
threshold for enumeration and that enumeration is rarely, if 
ever, attempted when event memory falls below this thresh- 
old.  Finally,  relatively  small  response  time  differences 
observed for the frequency conditions in Experiments 1 and 
2 suggest that people may directly code frequency informa- 
tion when they are expecting a frequency test and that direct 
retrieval  strategies  compete  with  enumeration  strategies 
when such information is available. 
Conclusion 
Psychologists have long speculated that multiple formats 
may be used to encode information about event frequency 
and  that  multiple  strategies  may  be  used  to  generate 
frequency judgments  (e.g., Hasher &  Zacks,  1984;  Hintz- 
man, 1976; Howell, 1973a; Johnson, Raye, Wang, & Taylor, 
1979;  Jonides  &  Naveh-Benjamin,  1987).  Yet,  it  is  only 
recently that researchers have demonstrated the existence of 
multiple frequency representations and estimation strategies 
(Blair &  Burton,  1987;  Brown,  1995;  Bruce  &  Van Pelt, 
1989; Burton & Blair, 1991; Conrad & Brown, 1996; Conrad 
et al.,  in press; Means  &  Loftus,  1991;  Menon,  1993). The 
multiple  strategy perspective that  has  emerged from this 
6 The response  time difference  was  one  of two enumeration 
indices evaluated. The other was the rank order correlation between 
estimated frequency and response time. This correlation should be 
strongest when people rely heavily on enumeration-based  strate- 
gies and weakest when enumeration is never used. One correlation 
was computed for each participant over the 30 target words. Then a 
mean correlation was taken for each condition over all participants. 
Not  surprisingly,  these  means  differed  widely  across  the  nine 
experimental  conditions,  with  the  context  memory  group  in 
Experiment 1 producing the strongest average correlation (M =  .69), 
and  the  frequency  participants  in  Experiment  2  producing  the 
weakest (M =  .20). Of more importance,  these means correlated 
almost perfectly with the response time differences (r =  .96). Thus, 
either  index  could  have  been  used  to  demonstrate  a  relation 
between strategy selection and context memory. In this context, it is 
worth noting that the rank order correlation between response time 
and percentage recall was also computed for each participant over 
the 30 target words and then averaged over all participants, within 
conditions. These averages ranged from .62 for the context memory 
group in Experiment 1 to .09 for the frequency group in Experiment 
2  and  correlated  almost perfectly  with  the  average correlation 
between estimated frequency and response time (r =  .98). In other 
words, when response times were related to estimated frequency, 
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research  holds  that  encoding  factors  influence  the  way 
information  about  event  frequency  is  represented,  that 
strategy selection is restricted by the task-relevant contents 
of memory, and  that  different  estimation  strategies  have 
distinctive behavioral consequences. 
The research described in this article provides support for 
the  multiple  strategy  perspective  by  demonstrating  that 
study  time,  target--context  relatedness,  and  study-phase 
instructions  affected  context  memory  and  that  context 
memory  and  response  time  were  related.  As  predicted, 
conditions yielding the best context memory also produced 
the steepest response time functions, and those yielding the 
worst produced the shallowest. Taking the steepness of these 
functions as an index of enumeration, this pattern indicates 
that enumeration-based strategies were executed most often 
when  event  instances  were  most  accessible  and  that  the 
tendency to enumerate decreased as event instances became 
more difficult to retrieve. Conversely, these findings indicate 
that participants relied on nonenumeration strategies when 
context  memory  was  poor,  but  not  when  it  was  good, 
Estimated frequency and event memory were also related in 
a way that is consistent with a multiple strategy interpreta- 
tion.  As  predicted,  participants  tended  to  underestimate 
event frequencies, except when context memory was very 
poor.  An  underestimation  bias  has  been  associated  with 
enumeration in prior studies (Brown, 1995; Burton & Blair, 
1991;  Conrad  &  Brown,  1994)  and  is  thought  to  occur 
because people often fail to retrieve all relevant events and 
because conservative enumeration-based estimates may lead 
people  to  induce  a  response  range  that  is  as  narrow  or 
narrower than the stimulus range. 
In brief, the pattern of response times and estimation bias 
observed in this study indicates that people enumerate some 
of the time, that the tendency to enumerate is determined, in 
part, by the availability of relevant event instances, and that 
the availability of event instances is influenced by a variety 
of encoding factors. The present  study also indicates that 
access to event instances is not the only factor that deter- 
mines  whether  people  enumerate.  The  results  from  the 
frequency conditions in Experiments 1 and 2 are of particu- 
lar relevance to this claim. In both cases, the response time 
functions were shallower than would have been expected if 
context memory were the only factor determining a prefer- 
enoe for enumeration, and in both cases, frequency estimates 
were less biased than those produced by participants receiv- 
ing context memory or general memory instructions. These 
results can be explained by assuming that participants in the 
frequency group were more likely to keep track of event 
frequency than were participants in other groups and that 
people may prefer to rely on prestored frequency informa- 
tion, when it is available, rather than to retrieve and count 
available event instances. 
Availability  of  event  instances  and  the  presence  of  a 
competing source of frequency-relevant information are not 
the  only  factors  that  determine  whether  an  enumeration- 
based strategy will be used. For example, there is evidence 
in the behavioral frequency literature that time restrictions 
reduce  the  use  of enumeration.  7 In one  study  (Burton  & 
Blair,  1991, Study 2), undergraduate business majors were 
given from 10 s to 70 s to estimate the number of courses 
taken outside of the business school. Retrospective written 
protocols were used to determine how these estimates were 
generated. Students in the 10-s group (61%) were much less 
likely to enumerate than students in the 70-s group (92%), 
and they provided less accurate estimates (also see Williams 
&  Durso,  1986,  Experiment  2).  This  indicates  that  the 
presence  of retrievable  instances  does  not  automatically 
trigger enumeration; if it did, enumeration-based responses 
would have been as common in the 10-s condition as in the 
70-s condition. 
Taken  together,  these  findings  provide  the  basis  for 
informed speculation about the nature of strategy selection 
in this task. In particular, it seems that people prefer concrete 
information (in the form of instance counts or directly coded 
frequency  facts)  to  vague  information  (in  the  form  of 
intuitions  supplied by memory assessment processes) and 
that they are willing to work quite hard to accumulate the 
former, provided they have enough time to do so. However, 
when two sources of information are equally credible (e.g., 
enumerated  counts  and  directly  coded  frequency  facts), 
people prefer the more convenient source. Thus, perceived 
accuracy  and  convenience  may  be  evaluated  when  an 
estimation strategy is  selected,  with accuracy given more 
weight  when  one  source  of information  is  clearly  more 
credible and convenience given more weight when compet- 
ing  sources  are considered  equally  credible,  or when  the 
more credible strategy is deemed to be too demanding. 
This article has focused on response times and, to a lesser 
extent,  on patterns  of estimation bias  because these  data 
provide  information  about  people's estimation  strategies. 
Measures  of  absolute  and  relative  accuracy  were  also 
reported above but were not discussed in detail because they 
reveal little about strategy selection. Nonetheless, it is worth 
noting that encoding factors did affect estimation accuracy. 
Specifically, relative accuracy (i.e., the rank order correla- 
tion between estimated and actual frequency) was better in 
Experiment  1  (related  context,  6-s  presentation)  than  in 
Experiment 2 (related context, 2-s presentation) or Experi- 
ment  3  (unrelated  context,  6-s  presentation),  and  study- 
phase instructions did affect relative accuracy in one experi- 
7 Researchers  who study  behavioral  frequency  estimation  are 
concerned with understanding how people estimate the frequency 
of real-world events or activities (e.g., "How many times have you 
gone shopping for groceries in the past month?"). This research 
indicates  that  people  estimate  behavioral  frequencies  and  list 
frequencies  in much the  same way. For example,  enumeration- 
based estimates are common when people are asked to estimate the 
frequency of distinctive, hence memorable, real-world events, and 
general  impression  strategies  are  often  used  when  the  to-be- 
estimated events are mundane, and hence difficult to recall. People 
also use direct-retrieval  strategies when responding to behavioral 
frequency  questions,  though  these  take  the  form of rate-based 
responses  (e.g.,  "I buy groceries  twice a week,  so I have gone 
shopping eight times in the past month"). Rate-based strategies are 
most commonly used when the target event happens on a regular 
basis (Blair & Burton,  1987; Bruce & Van Pelt,  1989; Burton & 
Blair, 1991; Conrad & Brown, 1996; Conrad et al., in press; Means 
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ment (Experiment 3).  s These differences provide evidence 
that  knowledge  of event  frequency  can  be  affected  by 
encoding factors and instructional manipulations (of. Barsa- 
lou &  Ross,  1986; Greene,  1984,  1986; Hanson &  Hirst, 
1988;  Hasher  &  Zacks,  1979,  1984;  Jonides  &  Naveh- 
Benjamin, 1987; Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1986; Rose & 
Rowe, 1976; Rowe, 1974; Williams & Durso, 1986; Zacks, 
Hasher, & Sanfl, 1982). However, they do not indicate that 
superior knowledge of relative event frequency was always 
related to the nature of the study-phase instructions, or to the 
time allotted for studying word pairs, or to the strength of the 
target-context association. Moreover, neither context memory 
nor  the  response  time  difference  measure  was  strongly 
predictive of relative accuracy. 
Although no simple generalization captures the pattern of 
differences displayed in Table 1, it is interesting that a high 
level of accuracy was achieved under all conditions and that 
the differences across conditions were quite modest. These 
facts, in conjunction with the evidence that different condi- 
tions  promote  the  use  of different  estimation  strategies, 
indicate  that  a  variety  of  mechanisms  are  capable  of 
generating accurate frequency judgments and that different 
strategies,  operating  on  different  types  of  task-relevant 
information, can produce comparable levels of estimation 
accuracy (Brown,  1995).  In  other words,  one estimation 
strategy is not necessarily better than another, and each is 
capable  of producing  an  accurate  assessment  of relative 
frequency,  provided the  available  information  accurately 
reflects the relative frequency of the target items. 
In retrospect, it is not surprising that estimated and actual 
frequency were highly correlated in the present study and in 
a previous one (Brown, 1995). After all, in both studies and 
in  all conditions, the  word pairs  were  studied under full 
attention, the study phase was followed immediately by the 
test phase, and presentation frequencies increased from 2 to 
16  in  a  roughly geometric  progression.  It  is  likely  that 
participants would have been less accurate in their assess- 
ment of event frequency if any one of these factors had been 
different. Both  divided  attention  during  the  study  phase 
(Greene,  1984,  1986;  Naveh-Benjamin &  Jonides,  1986) 
and delayed testing have been shown to reduce the accuracy 
of frequency estimates (Hintzman &  Stem,  1984;  Under- 
wood,  Zimmerman,  &  Freund,  1971).  Apparently,  full 
attention facilitates the encoding of frequency-relevant  infor- 
mation,  regardless  of its  form, and  forgetting caused  by 
delay makes  this  information less  reliable,  accessible, or 
predictive (Hintzman,  1988).  There is  also  evidence that 
people are  better able  to  discriminate  between  levels  of 
event frequency when the  levels are  widely  spaced  than 
when  they  are  close  together (Hintzman  &  Gold,  1983; 
I-Iintzman,  Grandy, &  Gold,  1981). This implies that one 
could affect the correlation between estimated and actual 
frequency by manipulating the frequency levels represented 
in the study list; other things being equal, relative accuracy 
should be good when the distance between levels is large 
and  poor when  it  is  not.  As  yet,  the  effects of divided 
attention, study-test delay, and list composition on strategy 
selection have not been investigated. However, to the extent 
that  these  factors  interfere  with  the  encoding,  retrieval, 
and/or  the  evaluation  of  individual  event  instances  or 
frequency counts, memory assessment strategies should be 
used  more  frequently and  enumeration-based  and  direct 
retrieval strategies less frequently. 
In  summary,  the present research indicates  that people 
tend to enumerate when they have ready access to retrieval 
event  instances,  and  it  suggests  that  people  use  direct 
retrieval  strategies  when facts  about event frequency are 
available  and  that they fall back on memory assessment 
strategies when enumeration and direct retrieval strategies 
cannot be used effectively. This research has also begun to 
identify the laboratory conditions that produce good context 
memory  and  that  promote  the  encoding  of  frequency- 
relevant facts. As a result, it is possible to anticipate when 
people are likely to use enumeration-based  and direct retrieval 
strategies. Moreover, to the extent that conditions associated with 
enumeration and direct retrieval are well understood, it should be 
possible to create conditions in which people rely exclusively on 
memory assessment strategies. This is of  interest for two reasons. 
First,  memory  assessment  appears  to  be  the  most  widely 
applicable  of the frequency estimation  strategies, yet the most 
difficult to understand.  Second, it is possible that the processes 
that inform the memory assessment  strategies may be the ones 
that  mediate  frequency  effects  in  perception,  language 
processing, and judgment and decision making. Thus, there 
are good reasons for wanting to study memory assessment 
strategies in isolation, and there are now also good reasons 
for believing this can be done. 
8 It is also true that there were between-experiment differences in 
absolute error. Overall, absolute error was smaller in Experiment 1 
(M = 2.7) than in Experiment 2 (M = 3.6), and smaller in Experi- 
ment 2 than in Experiment 3 (M = 4.4). However, measures of 
absolute accuracy reveal less about knowledge of event frequency 
than do measures of relative accuracy because absolute error is 
determined jointly by beliefs about  the response range  and by 
beliefs about the relative frequency of the target items (Brown, 
1995; Brown & Siegler, 1993). 
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